Wisest of the crowds

The US Commerce Department reported various housing data this morning that confirms the poor state of affairs in the US housing market. Specifically:

- Building permits for single-family homes in December were 10.1 percent (±1.6%) below the November figure and 25.3 percent (±0.8%) below the December 2006 figure.

- Single-family housing starts in December were 2.9 percent (±8.7)* below November and 24.8 percent (±1.3%) below the December 2006 level.

- According the AP, it will take 9.6 months to eliminate the backlog of unsold new homes at the December sales pace, the longest stretch of time since the month’s supply stood at 10.3 months in October 1981.

You can see the data and release at this Commerce website.

What’s really interesting is that the markets are shrugging this off. Take a look at this mornings prices of home builders, complements of Google Finance:

Ths homebuilders have been rallying since the market low reached the day the Fed lowered interest rates 75 basis points on an emergency cut with another 50 basis points expected TOMORROW.

Having said all this, markets ALWAYS move further and harder than expected. More problems seem likely without some extreme structural (read fiscal) or economic stimulus. The Fed seems to be doing its part. Will the Government in the midst of an election year?

The National Association of Realtors reported that their “Pending Home Sales Index” for July fell to its lowest level since the post Sept. 11, 2001 period as a result of tightening credit for Jumbo mortgage loans (loans over $417,000).

So what is this index? Directly from the NAR release:

“The Pending Home Sales Index is based on a large national sample, typically representing about 20 percent of transactions for existing-home sales. In developing the model for the index, it was demonstrated that the level of monthly sales-contract activity from 2001 through 2004 parallels the level of closed existing-home sales in the following two months. “

It seems that Three Stooges of the mortgage ecosystem, lenders (Curly), Wall Street mortgage underwriters (Moe), and mortgage buyers (Larry) all woke up after a night of drinking and decided never again (well, at least for a few weeks!) ! These Jumbo loans are NOT purchased by the quasi-government agencies Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac whose job it is to purchase loans from lenders so that lenders have the funds to make more loans - a mechanism to facilitate home ownership for average and lower income home buyers. Jumbo loans do not qualify so they must be either held by lenders or sold to investors via wall street. Since Fannie and Freddie have continued to support loans at the low-end while the high-end has lost free market support, Jumbo’s have shut down for the minority and have gotten MUCH more expensive for the majority. Not surprisingly, the Western part of the US, which has the highest home prices and presumably the most Jumbo loans, got hit hardest being down a whopping 20.8% to 82.3 versus 89.9 nationally.

Will this last? No way. This is a temporary disruption as people reorient their perspective to risk. Will the cost of jumbo’s (as a spread to treasury securities) increase? You can bet on it!

No not what you are thinking - not social, ethnic, or racial discrimination. Redfin discriminates on price. PRICE! The 60 minutes piece was a yawn for me personally but it does give Americans the right to start to push back. See the posts and comments at TechCrunch, Redfin, Inman, BloodHound for an early read. Whether it becomes a consumer zeitgeist or fades will be seen but the open question is this: will price variation become mainstream in american residential real estate?

There is an old economic idea called price discrimination that is popular with every micro-econ 101 student, and their professors, that says you reach more customers and make more money by offering variation in pricing. Its sort of definitional for anyone who believes in supply and demand. It works like this: when you go to see a baseball game, there are a 100 variations in pricing to meet everyones needs and to tap into every possible cross section of demand. For example, there are ticket prices for corporations who entertain in luxury boxes and ticket prices for those who mostly prefer a beer and some sun in the bleechers. Ticket prices for season holders and ticket prices for last minute shoppers. In short, EVERYONE can have their demand met for baseball. A small example with the mighty SF Giants here.

What would happen if every ticket was the same price? Mayhem and lost profits. Some people willing to pay more for MLB tickets will transfer their money to an underground marketplace that will use price discovery to allocate tickets. Meanwhile, people at lower price points will be shut out resulting in further lost revenues to MLB. Thats why we have pricing variation. Its better for everyone because everyone gets an allocation and the business folks maximize their revenues.
People might argue that the price variation exists is in the underlying house price and not in the intermediary execution price (brokers & agents). If that were true, then why did trading volume in financial markets explode when electronic execution came into acceptance? (For a slightly more technical explanation {very slightly!}, see my earlier post here).

Redfin discriminates. So do I. It makes sense and it is better for everyone. Many people have commented that Redfin basically passes their work load to external agents to facilitate their transactions and to make their business model work. I can certainly see how that might play out. But if the consumer is footing the work load “bill”, don’t they deserve to get a rebate? Don’t consumers deserve the right to choose their level of service? In the end I believe that consumers will still depend on full service agents because housing is complicated and its something we do rarely. But by offering price variation, we get to grow the pie. Anyone else out there a discriminator? Anyone else want to make more money?

Trulia took a big step into socializing camp by creating a Q&A platform with the help of Pat Kitano. Very sharp looking implementation that now solidly takes Trulia from exclusively broker centric to also being agent centric. The list of reviews worth reading follows: Pat Kitano, StartupSquad, TechCrunch, Joel Burslem, Greg Swann.

Trulia’s implementation is clean and certainly ups the feature ante but is basically catch-up with others including Zillow and My-Currency. User generated content is interesting and valuable but is this going to turn into some sort of vertical social networking war where winner takes all? The audience of home shoppers currently is much older and much more tech phobic than what you might see at typical social networks so what the hell are we all doing? Is this web2.0 hipsters flexing, an investment in future behavior by home buyers & sellers, or part of some master plan to disintermediate the existing ecosystems? All three isnt a bad guess.

For a while I have been wondering which direction Trulia would point their ship - towards the incumbents or away?. It feels to me like listings are a commodity waiting to happen and so the question for listings aggregators, like Trulia, is what next? Going social gets them on plan to taking Zillow head-on without alienating their existing constituents. Zillow has ignored the brokers while Trulia has made them their buddies. Each has their natural advantages and disadvantages but Trulia’s is a safer and more optionable route. Only if you raise a bunch of money can you take the path Zillow is taking. The payoff for Zillow, however, is much bigger with the risk because the consumers are the customers and Zillow does this very well. The real estate industry will never go back and the question I have as an entrepreneur is which strategy will win? One that eats its way through the ecosystem (Trulia) or one that completely goes around it (Zillow)?View blog reactions

Ardell DellaLoggia of the Rain City Guide pens one the best pieces I have seen regarding housing valuations at a hyper-local level. Entitled Home Valuation “Tools”, Ardell goes on to detail how to properly value a property and how to seperate the value of the land versus the value of the house…an important consideration, often overlooked, in expensive markets where most of the value is actually land (I am talking to you San Francisco!).  Her analysis is deep so get a pencil out but the basic takeaway is that if you can determine the cost of land, and make adjustments for slight differences, you should be able to determine which houses are overpriced and which ones are underpriced.  Ardell finds a home that was torn down after being purchased and so was able to get a solid market value for land. Getting everything apples to apples is critical - and not easy.
Her analysis is not only thorough, but also demonstrates that housing valuation is a highly complex problem that has variation from property to property. In other words, it is very difficult to model and so AVM’s will largely miss the nuances. Naturally we at My-Currency have built our site for this very reason - to enable the local experts to shine and to collect these nuances both in detail and as an aggregated value in our prediction technology we call CrowdValue.

More news from the Commerce Department (pdf) yesterday - the number of homes sitting empty has increased fairly dramatically. Homeowner vacancy increased to 2.8% from 2.1% and rental vacancy increased to 10.1% from 9.5% versus the first quarter of 2006. That means that there are now almost 4 million units for rent, 2.2 million houses for sale and 7.3 millions units vacant for no apparent reason (dead cities?). When looking at homeowner data by area, cities increased 60% to 4% occupancy, Metropolitan Statistical Areas increased 45% to 2.9%, and suburbs increased 33% to 2.4%. Regionally, the South has both the highest rental and homeowner vacancy. The data below:

The Commerce Department released more data and analysis confirming what we know - that housing is dragging the economy. The economy grew just 1.3% (preliminarily) for the first quarter of 2007. From the press release:

The increase in real GDP in the first quarter primarily reflected positive contributions from personal consumption expenditures (PCE) and state and local government spending that were partly offset by negative contributions from residential fixed investment, private inventory investment, and federal government spending.

Here is a chart of GDP going back a few years:

As you can see, things haven’t been this bad since Q1 2003. The markets largely shrugged this off but home builders took it on the chin:

Most of the big names down around 3% but the index as a whole finished down just 1.52%

Looking for a great buy-rent analysis tool? Go no further the the New York Times. My friend Kevin Boer blogged about it here, and I have to further endorse this product. Very cool Ajax interface and has all the things you need to understand the issues. Warning! Do not accept their base assumptions, some of which are in “Advanced Settings”, “General”. The main value to a tool like this is playing with different assumptions so that you can understand the real drivers. I have inputted some assumptions below based on a friends analysis of spending $6,850 to rent a house that might ordinarily cost him $2 million in San Francisco (yes, these are real numbers…it is that expensive here!).

Three Key Assumptions:

- Housing Value increase 4% per annum

- Rent increases 2% per annum (San Francisco is largely rent controlled)

- Investment returns of 6.5%

You can see there is no scenario that allows one to buy versus rent. So what does it take to get the buy-rent math to justify buying? Well if you increase housing prices to 5% increases per year then you get a break-even point of 7 years and if you increase it to 6% then you get a break-even point of 3 years. Although I held investment returns constant at 6.5%, prices increases for housing coincide with general returns in assets so realistically I should probably be increasing investment returns with any increase in house price appreciation . Why is this relationship so important? Because when you have money tied up in your house, that money is no longer available to invest. If you are a crappy investor no problem. If you know your way around, this makes the math even more difficult. So if I increase investment returns to match my original assumptions of 4% appreciation and 6.5% investment returns (2.5% spread), then the following buy-rent trade-off emerges:

So buying is better after 5 years but the gets worse at year 15. Why? Compounding. It seems the real issue is what is the relationship between housing returns and investment returns…something I will blog about in the future.

What was my recommendation to my friend? Rent and look for a distressed seller.

Local Resources:

San Francisco Assessor-Recorder

City of San Francisco Rent Board

My post yesterday entitled “Dead Cat Bounce Revealed” was further confirmed today when the Commerce Department released their March 2007 data (PDF) for New Home Sales that showed a slight increase nationally over last month but terrible data versus a year earlier. Inman covered it here. Here are the facts:

- Nationally, the new home sales increase 2.7% versus February but down 23.5% versus same month last year
- The Northeast is the only bright spot, showing an astounding 50% increase versus February and 18.0% versus March 2006. Note: the Northeast accounts for only 8.4% of the national sales transaction as of the latest data.
- The West is the worst performing region and was down 0.9% versus February 2007 and down 29.6% versus March 2006 . The West accounts for 25.2% of National activity.

- Months of supply decreased to 7.8 months from 8.1 months

- There was no discernable shift in price point composition.

By the way, the dead cat bounce reference is one used by pro’s in the financial markets to describe how a bear market rally bounces similarly to how a dead cat bounces off of the pavement (hint: modestly). Tasteless, but there it is!

Kenneth Harney pens another interesting piece entitled How ’systematic inattention’ led to subprime fiasco. My favorite line:

Ninety percent of the appraisers in a 2006 national survey by October Research Corp. said they had experienced threats, nonpayment of fees and other forms of coercion. Many said they had lost business by refusing to play the game.

Harney also details a few scams worth a read but perhaps the key point is that the commercial incentives of banks and other intermediaries are wrecking havoc on the reputations of appraisers. Is it time to re-examine incentives and better structure the industry? Should buyers hire appraisers rather than bankers and agents? I discussed this earlier here.